Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) pose significant humanitarian problems to the civilians as well as to the governments in post conflict situations. People continue to be at risk even after the war due to the presence of ERW. The issue of ERW has in fact shifted the focus of the international community from the immediate impacts of the weapons to their long term effects. In response to this, states concluded a landmark agreement, Protocol V to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 2003 (CCW). This Protocol aims at providing a proper mechanism to deal with ERW threat. Meanwhile, with the beginning of the new century and the emergence of newly sophisticated weapons the debate over the ERW got shifted to one of the most menacing category of weapons called cluster munitions. Again, responding to the problem, the state parties adopted the Convention of Cluster Munitions 2003 which bans the use and development of these deadly weapons. Both these instruments suffer from certain inherent limitations. Despite these limitations they still serve as the last resort for the civilians as well as for the governments of the war torn communities in dealing with the catastrophic effects of ERW.
Introduction
"Wars do not always end with the last gunshot or the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The remnants of war are also a threat to civilians and military personnel alike and impede humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and development". 1 Warfare is by its very nature very lethal and damaging. Weapons that are indiscriminate by their very nature or by the reason of their operation are verboten. Even when properly targeted, many explosive weapons fail to function as designed and become explosive remnants of war (ERW). 2 Every modern conflict generally leaves behind large amounts of explosive remnants of war. 3 These are the explosive munitions that have been fired, dropped or otherwise delivered during the fighting but have failed to explode as intended or have been abandoned by the warring parties on the battle field. 4 This is a persistent problem 5 and a grave threat 6 that 16 and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). 17 Protocol V"s definition of ERW provides two important modifications to the popular understanding of ERW-as-UXO. The first one is the inclusion of "abandoned explosive ordnance" which marks a departure from the traditional meaning of ERW as UXO and it now includes weapons that were not used at all. 18 The second modification is that this new legal definition specifically excludes the remnants that would not 1348, art. 2(3) (Protocol V defines AXO as "explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it").
fall under the category of ERW 19 due to separate obligation under CCW Amended Protocol II 20 and thus making the classification much easier. But here exists a potentially problematic gap between an understanding of ERW with regard to legal obligations of state parties and an understanding of effective clearance operations. This technical definition may produce difficulties for the clearance team regarding what are they supposed to clear on the ground. 21 In order to resolve this conflict, the definition proposed by Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) can be taken into account. 22 The GICHD divided the ERW threat into four broad areas that are useful as a framework to comprehend better what ordnance might pragmatically be included in ERW risk: Therefore, this definition of ERW is helpful in avoiding the clash between the practical and legal understanding of explosive remnants of war.
Impact of Explosive Remnants of War on Humanity
As the Preamble of Protocol V of CCW, 2003 recognizes, the presence of ERW creates crippling humanitarian effects in war torn countries. The most evident of them is the casualties that they cause. On an average ERW kill or injure more people than landmines and put a heavy toll on medical infrastructure. 26 They are unpredictable and can be exploded at any time under a variety of stimuli. Known as killing fields 27 in Cambodia and devil's gardens 28 in Afghanistan, areas contaminated with explosive remnants of war are known for their impartiality when claiming victims, the majority of whom are children. 29 involves the staged surgical management of the wounded, often at different echelons of care and provided by different surgeons which is again very difficult to find in post conflict situations. 36 Even with the passage of time, survivors often have low levels of overall physical health 37 and experience on going pain as a result of their injuries. 38 Most survivors show symptoms of chronic post traumatic stress disorder, and survivors often have reduced emotional well being due to depression, anxiety, fear, anger, dependence on others, and isolation. 39 The victims often endure psychological trauma in addition to physical injury. 40 ERW also hampers efforts of the affected communities to achieve sustainable development. 41 application of community infrastructure and resources for reconstruction. Also, they deny access to land 42 and hinder free movement and in poor community people have no choice but to use the contaminated land. 43 Further the agricultural capacity will diminish 44 because access to land is mired by the presence of UXOs. Vast tracts of valuable land continue to be plagued by landmine and ERW contamination. 45 According to a survey conducted in Laos in 1997, around 87,213 square kilometers of land (out of a country wide total of 236,800 square kilometers) are considered as being at risk from UXO contamination and thus of no use to the many of which are recovering from years or decades of war. Every new casualty adds an increasing burden on health structures already strained beyond capacity by the need to support hundreds of thousands of landmine survivors injured in the 1980s and 1990s civilians. 46 In addition to this, due to their metallic value, people, especially in poor communities undertake the risk of locating and extracting these explosives. 47 The simple answer to why people deliberately handle them is because they have no other means of survival. The World Bank also pointed out these adverse effects of ERW on the economy of war torn communities in 2004. 48 Fear of ERW makes it difficult for the people to overcome physiological trauma of war. 49 (ERW) to the civil population as well as to peace keeping forces is of great humanitarian concern. Because of a lack of specific legal regulations on the issue of ERW, a large number of innocents have been killed or injured by ERW after conflicts have ended).
The illicit trade of these abandoned explosives links them with more serious issues of terrorism. 52 The natural environment of the region also gets severely affected. 53 All in all, ERW affect all stages of conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. 54
Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 2003
The use of so called 'cluster bombs' in the Kosovo Campaign in 1999 generated much discussion over the problems of clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO). 55 Each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall bear their responsibilities set out in this Article with respect to all explosive remnants of war in the territory under its control. In cases where a use of explosive ordnance which has become explosive remnants of war, does not exercise control of the territory, the user shall, after the cessation of active hostilities, provide where feasible, inter alia technical, financial, material or human resources assistance, bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including inter alia through the United Nations system or other relevant organizations, to facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or destruction of such explosive remnants of war.
The clearance and disposal are urgently required as soon as the conflict ends. 62 The first obligation which the Protocol V of CCW 2003 casts on every party is to clear the remnants in their own territory. Apart from this, it casts an additional responsibility on the users of the explosive ordnance to provide assistance, 63 wherever feasible, to carry out clearance work outside their territory. 64 And all these must be carried out "after the cessation of s-internationalstandards/english/series-09/IMAS-09-11-Ed1-Am1. 65 In this regard, the parties are required to take into account the international standards. 66 These measures include threat survey, assessment of needs, marking and resource mobilization to successfully carry out clearance operations. Priority setting of the affected area is also required. 67 All these operations must be carried out by the qualified operators. 68 Measures to facilitate the rapid and safe clearance of ERW are essential in addressing the problem.
Warnings and Risk Education Relating to Explosive Remnants of War
Under Article 5 of the Protocol V of CCW 2003, parties are required to take all feasible precautions to protect the post conflict community from the effects of ERW. This obligation is much narrower in operation as it is applicable only to the party in control of the contaminated territory. Also, it only talks about all feasible precautions 69 and not all necessary precautions. The sole objective of providing warnings is to reach as many people as soon as possible with advice on threat and correct behavior to be adopted responsibility is the result of the opposition of US to the draft which contained a binding responsibility on the users to cooperate in the clearance work). 65 after the war. 70 The present structure of the said Article as well as its annexure are largely based on the report submitted by the GICHD during the negotiation process in order to address the main issues concerning warnings and risk education. 71, 72 The annexure of the article and the report inter alia includes the following:
a) It considers information collection as the basic necessity of Mine Risk Education (MRE) 73 and this information may include threat analysis, country analysis and population analysis.
b) It provides for the mechanism of using such information to plan MRE strategy.
c) It also emphasizes on the role of the community in reducing risk and clarifies the position about who should provide such warnings.
d) Finally, it outlines what MRE should provide.
Moreover, the Annexure of the said Protocol provides for the adoption of proper procedure for marking, fencing, monitoring and utilization of warning signs near the contaminated region while taking into account the prevailing national and international standards and "at the earliest opportunity". Tool to Protect Civilians from the effects of ERW". 74 In this they identified various humanitarian information requirements essential for the clearance team like location, number, characters and method of destroying of munitions used. It also provided various considerations relating to such information sharing. 75 Another paper in this regard was submitted by Landmine Action identifying the necessity of information sharing. 76 Based on these papers and negotiations, Article 4 was engendered in the said Protocol. It states that-
Dissemination of Information about Explosive Remnants of War

"High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict shall to the maximum extent possible and as far as practicable record and retain information on the use of explosive ordnance or abandonment of explosive ordnance, to facilitate the rapid marking and clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war, risk education and the provision of relevant information to the party in control of the territory and to civilian population in the territory."
Further Article 4(2) of the said Protocol states that "make available such information to the party or parties in control of the affected area". Therefore both high contracting parties and parties to the conflict must retain and record the information on the use or abandonment of weapons "as far as practicable". Further, under Article 4(2), such information must be shared without delay and "after the cessation of hostilities", with the party in control of the affected region bilaterally or with the help of mutually agreed third party.
Assistance to Victims of Explosive Remnants of War 77
Article 7 The only difference between the two is while Article 7 covers the problem caused by ERW already existing at the time the state become party to the Protocol, Article 8 applies only to those ERW cases that arise after the entry of party to the Protocol. Article 7 provides the High Contracting parties facing the ERW problem with the right to seek assistance from other states or organizations. Also, it casts a parallel obligation on the parties to provide assistance to other states dealing with such problem. Again this obligation is also subject to the qualifications such as "when necessary" and "where feasible". The major challenges faced while implementing these programs are access to care, capacity and sustainability, progress monitoring and prioritization.
Generic Preventive Measures to Minimize the Occurrence of Explosive Remnants of War
The Preamble of the Protocol V of CCW 2003 itself lays emphasis on adopting generic preventive measures in order to minimize the occurrence of ERW. Poor manufacturing, improper storage, improper handling, incorrect launch profiles, poor strike angles, environment and insufficient training are basically the reasons for their occurrence. 80 This has further been dealt under Article 9 of the said Protocol which "encourages parties to take generic preventive measures". This means that this provision is not mandatory but voluntary in nature.
Some of the measures are provided in the Technical Annex to the Article which contains the best practices which would help in reducing the volume of UXOs if properly followed.
The measures outlined in the Annex are: 81 1. Munition manufacturing management to make sure that the weapons may not become ERW.
2. Munition management to ensure their long term reliability.
3. Training of all personnel involved in handling and use of weapons.
4. Proper transfer of weapons after ensuring that receiving state has the adequate facilities for their use.
5. Future production and improvement of the quality of weapons.
All these measures would simplify any post conflict effort of the government.
Limitations of Protocol V of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 2003
Sometimes, the slowness of the Convention is criticized as even after 6 years of its ratification, it has only been signed by 78 states. 82 Fourth Review Conference of CCW also reiterated its goal of universalisation of the Convention. 83 Also, the Protocol is a legally binding text, but many of its qualifiers leave ample room for avoiding obligations. For instance, the states are not bound to deal with regions currently affected by ERW and it solely applies to future conflicts, although it does allow affected state parties to ask for voluntary cooperation and assistance for existing problems. It can be argued that such an instrument should either be fully binding or merely a political statement but not a mixture of both. 84 But despite all these limitations this Protocol represents advancement in international humanitarian law for ensuring the safety of post conflict societies.
Cluster Munition
By a process of elimination, the effort to address ERW has quickly come to focus primarily on one subgroup with the most serious impact on humanity. 85 A cluster munition is defined as a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. 86 A submunition is an individual item of explosive ordnance contained within the dispenser or "parent munition" and which is ejected, expelled, or dispersed at some point after the cluster munition is fired, launched, expelled, or dropped. 87 These bomblets are versatile in nature and each bomblet essentially acts similar to a powerful hand grenade. 88 At least 75 countries worldwide have stockpiled cluster munitions. 89 It was found that up to 30,000 cluster munitions were left as UXO following the war in 1999. 90 Also between 1998 and 2006, there were a total of 124 reported cluster munitions casualties in Cambodia. 91 Cluster bombs are particularly more harmful than other weapons because of the two reasons. Firstly the cluster bomb is an "area weapon", because their contents spread over a wide area, or footprint. 92 When multiple cluster munitions are deployed in tandem, the area multiplies and can cover up to 27,000 football fields sometimes. 93 Secondly, a significant percentage of the small cluster bombs are duds. Due to the high failure rates of submunitions, many do not detonate on impact and pose a serious threat to civilians long after the fighting has ceased. 94 Since the small cluster bombs often look like toys, children tend to pick them up, often resulting in death or amputation. 95 96 The presence of these unexploded submunitions impedes all aspects of post conflict recovery. Hence, because of these two factors i.e. wider footprints and high dud rates, they pose greater dangers on the civilians as compared to other weapons.
Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008
Recently during Second Lebanon War, Israel fired around 1.2 million cluster bombs on Lebanon. Given the official failure rate of 3%-14%, it could be well deciphered that around 21,000 failed bomblets are still lurking in the Lebanese soil. 97 This frequent use of cluster munitions raised a lot of hue and cry in the international community. Human Rights Watch in memorandum to CCW delegates pointed out that not only their use but also the effects of cluster munitions as ERW are discriminatory. 98 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also, in its paper submitted to CCW delegates observed the need for a specific instrument to 96 address the problem. 99 In the meantime, two international tribunals have found two defendants liable for civilian deaths caused by cluster munitions. 100 All these efforts and events, followed by the culmination of the "Oslo Process", under whose heading five conferences were held between It reads as "Each State Party shall, separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction". It further adds that "Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions, as soon as possible, but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party". Article 4 requires state parties to clear and destroy cluster munitions remnants under their control within ten years.
Limitations of Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008
The CCM 2008 has little power because the major producers and users have not joined it yet. 103 Also, Article 21 of CCM 2008 which talks about joint military operations with the non state parties and allows the state parties to engage in the activities prohibited under the convention has also been criticized for poor drafting and elements of uncertainty. 104 Further Article 3(6) of CCM 2008, which provides for retention of cluster munitions for training purpose, also limits the operation of its key provisions.
Though CCW 2003 takes care of negative after effects of cluster munitions, but it also has its own limitations as discussed earlier.
Negotiations are going on about adopting a sixth protocol to CCW 2003 which would deal with cluster munition problem. 105 Till now, no effective conclusion has been reached. 
Conclusion
Explosive remnants of war (ERW) have a great impact on the lives and livelihood of millions of people around the globe. They leave both immediate and long term impacts on affected communities thereby intensifying the human suffering during and after humanitarian crises. But a large proportion of these effects are both predictable and preventable as people"s decisions to engage with ordnance are likely to be driven by some form of vulnerability or capacity, most likely in combination. 106 The task of dealing with ERW is broad, comprehensive and resource intensive. However, we do have solutions in the form of Protocol V and CCM 2008. Despite their limitations, they represent a major advancement for the safety of the civilians in war torn communities. Countries should come forward to ratify these instruments and universalize them for their proper implementation.
Apart from this, improved cooperation is required at every level and the nation states should look beyond the borders in order to tackle this problem. International community is more than willing to work out a permanent solution to the ERW problem but it is incumbent upon all the nations to translate this shared willingness into a decisive action. It is the responsibility of each individual party to these instruments to fulfill obligations both binding as well as voluntary. Strong political will is essential to deal comprehensively and honestly with the issue of ERW and to arrive at a realistic and useful field solution. 
